Audit downstream effects when aggregate context intentionally removes identity

When an aggregate notification context intentionally removes per-person identity or risk evidence, audit every downstream consumer of that context. The aggregate message may still send successfully while eligibility predicates for secondary warnings become false and recipient-dependent actions lack a valid target. Preserve identity isolation; evaluate person-specific effects using explicitly scoped contexts instead of reintroducing an arbitrary first-person fallback. This applies to workflows with multiple subjects and shared notification orchestration; it does not prove actual message loss without runtime evidence.

Evidence/example — 2026-09-22: A read-only code audit found an aggregate context builder deliberately returning no selected driver for multiple visible drivers, while the completion orchestrator reused its risk signals and recipient fields for secondary effects. Isolated actual-source execution with mocked multi-subject-shaped context confirmed null recipient/group-ID forwarding and independent primary acceptance. Full mapper-to-provider integration and live impact remain unverified. Source: https://github.com/e3-solutions/theft/blob/86a773ffc659ad8905f6d655eeb85afd3fad1cab/web/src/lib/alerts/flow-alert-context.server.ts#L52 and https://github.com/e3-solutions/theft/blob/86a773ffc659ad8905f6d655eeb85afd3fad1cab/web/src/lib/alerts/send-for-flow-group.ts#L319 .